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THE

SPLIT

IN

THE CAPITALIST WORLD

The rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Common Market marks the biggest setback for United States global
policy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution in 1949. It
seems likely that a radically new period of postwar history is
opening.
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to have in
mind a conception of the general aims of American policy, of
what has been called Washington's "Grand Design" for the
world of the second half of the 20th century. This design has of
course never been laid down in a precise blueprint, but its main
outlines are well known and have been described in general
terms in innumerable public pronouncements. For example, in
his 1961 trade expansion message to Congress, President Kennedy said:
The combined output and purchasing power of the United
States and Western Europe-nearly a trillion dollars a year-is
more than twice as great as that of the entire Sino-Soviet world.
Though we have ,only half the population, and far less than half
the terri tory, we can pool our resourcefulness in an open trade
partnership strong enough to outstrip any challenge, and strong
enough to undertake all the many enterprises around the world
which the maintenance and progress of freedom require. If we
can take this step, Marxist predictions of "capitalist" empires
warring over markets and stifling competition would be shattered
for all time-Communist hopes for a trade war between these two
economic giants would be frustrated-and Communist efforts to
split the West would be doomed to failure.
One need only know that in official Washington language
"partnership" means American control, to see in this statement a
bold claim to United States hegemony over the "free world."
This is the keystone of the "Grand Design," and the way it is to
be implemented can be deduced from the specific decisions and
policies of the present administration and those which preceded
it in office during the past two decades. To put the matter in
the simplest possible terms, American hegemony is to be achieved
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and perpetuated in two ways: first, through an American
empire organized and directed from Washington; and, second,
through two subordinate empires headed respectively by the
Common Market expanded to include Britain, and Japan. Each
of the two subordinate empires is to be organized and directed
from its own metropolis, with Washington retaining an ultimate veto power over policies and decisions which are deemed
inimical to the interests of the "free world" as a whole, that
is to say, inimical to the interests of the American ruling class
as interpreted in Washington. All three metropolises-the An1erican, the European, and the Japanese-have a free rein to exploit their own empires through long-term investments, provision of banking and other services, controlling import and
export trade, and so on. The U.S. participates in the exploitation of the subordinate empires primarily through investment
in the metropolises-the form of U. S. foreign investment which
has tended to be quantitatively predominant in the last few
years.
The techniques in use for achieving these results are varied
and numerous. First, there is the crucially important ideological
justification for the acceptance by all concerned of U. S. hegemony. This of course is the Communist menace, compounded
of the threat of Soviet ( and/ or Chinese) aggression and the
threat of internal subversion. All countries in the "free world"
are supposed to be in mortal danger from one or both of these
threats; they all therefore need U. S. military protection and
none can afford to go it alone for fear of being picked off one
at a time. Granted these premises, the legitimacy of U. S. hegemony, indeed the urgent necessity for it, follows automatically.
In the light of this, it is not surprising that the propagation
of anti-Communism becomes the central task of all intellectual
and educational effort by the American ruling class. To the extent that the anti-Communist message gets through to the masses
in the dependent countries, their very dependency acquires a
popular base.
Economically, U. S. hegemony is buttressed by a wide
variety of techniques depending on the particular situation and
requirements of the different dependencies. Private investment,
government loans, monopolization of vital imports or exports,
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control over important technologies-these are examples of the
kinds of leverage exercised by the U. S. on the dependent
economies. In this connection, however, an important fact must
be noted: because of vigorous economic development in Europe
and Japan during the past decade or so, U . S. economic leverage
on the subordinate empires is much less than it used to be. As
far as Western Europe is concerned, indeed, it can now be said
that full economic independence has been achieved.
Politically, the methods employed by the United States
range from a complicated network of pacts and alliances to the
classical techniques of divide-and-rule practiced by all the great
empire builders of the past. Dependencies are graded in a
hierarchical scale of status and privilege; rivalry for favor is
encouraged and the contestants are suitably rewarded or punished; excessive power concentrations are either prevented from
forming or are watered down if they occur. It is in this connection that the matter of British entry into the Common Market
acquires its transcendent importance for American policy. The
United States encouraged the formation of the Comrron Market
by the original Six (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and then saw it grow rapidly
in coherence and strength. The threatened emergence of a
powerful rival was an obvious danger that had to be countered.
The tactic chosen by the U. S. was to push Britain, the most
privileged ally, into the Market, thereby ensuring that U. S.
interests would at all times be respected. After British entry,
the cohesiveness of the grouping would be further weakened by
the adherence of some or all of Britain's partners in the European Free Trade Association (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland). French President de Gaulle,
in his famous news conference of January 14th, foresaw the
results with great clarity: a community increasing in this way,
he said,
would be faced with the pr.oblerns of its economic relations with
all sorts of other nations and, first of all, with the United States.
It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be
very numerous and very different w.ould not stand up for long and
that in the last resort it would appear as a colossal Atlantic
Community dependent upon a control by the United States and
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which would have soon absorbed the community of Europe. (N ew
York Times, Western Edition, January 15, 1963.)

The military means of ensuring American hegemony again
vary according to the specific situation of the various dependencies. Financial aid for purchase of American weapons
plus military training missions may be sufficient to guarantee
the loyalty to Washington of dominant military establishments
in some of the weaker dependencies. One-sided treaties providing for U. S. military bases create quasi-occupation regimes.
Integrated commands, such as those which characterize the
NATO military setup, have the effect of bringing part of the
allies' forces under direct American control. Finally, and most
important vis-a.-vis the leaders of the subordinate empires, the
United States aims to maintain an absolute and pre-emptiv(
military preponderance by preventing any of its allies from
achieving an effective nuclear capability.
Such, in briefest outline, is the Grand Design for a "free
world" run from Washington. If it could be realized- if all
the parts could be put together and made to function smoothly
-the United States could then proceed to attempt a settlement
with the socialist world, either through a continuation and intensification of the Cold War or, much less likely, through some
sort of an agreement to live and let live.
Now it is clear that the rejection of Britain's bid to join
the Common Market, together with the closely related refusal
of France to accept the U. S. plan for a so-called multilateral
nuclear force (in reality a device for perpetuating America's
atomic monopoly in the "free world"), have dealt a shattering
blow to all Washington'S calculations. The concentration of
power represented by the Common Market is not to be w.atered
down by the admission of the most favored ally of the United
States. It can hardly be over-emphasized that this has far more
than merely negative significance. The Common Market grouping will naturally go on building up its power, and the United
States will either go on trying to bring it under control or set
about breaking it up. Whichever aim the U. S. pursues, the
two power centers are now certain to develop as antagonists in
a continuing and intensifying struggle. In the world of power
politics, there is simply no middle road between subordination
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and struggle for supremacy. The rejection of Britain's entry
was at the same time the Market's rejection of subordination;
from now on there can only be struggle.
The French decision to go ahead with the development of
an independent nuclear capability was a logical corollary and
necessary complement of the rejection of Britain's entry. Nor
does this decision have only military significance. In the world
as it is constituted today, technological independence necessarily implies military independence. If France were to renounce the development of nuclear weapons, she would at the
same time be putting shackles on her own scientific-technological development. She would, in other words, be accepting
technological as well as military subordination to the United
States. (France is the country principally involved at the moment, but it goes without saying that the other members of
the Six, especially West Germany, will soon be fully immersed
in the military-technological race- according to some accounts,
the French atomic effort is already in reality a Franco-German
_
effort.)
One part of the American Grand Design, perhaps the
most important part, thus lies in ruins. The nucleus of what
was to have been the subordinate European empire has opted
out and now has no choice but to try to build an independent
empire. The "free world," far from being united under U. S.
leadership, is divided against itself and threatened with internecine strife.
But this is still not all. Though it is perhaps not yet obvious, recent events cannot help having a serious undermining effect on the anti-Communist ideology which, as previously noted,
provides the sole justification for America's claim to "free
world" hegemony. Not that the Common Market is any less
impeccably anti-Communist than the United States, of course.
The point is that by taking the course they are now embarked
upon, the Six are in effect laughing at the whole elaborate pretense that there is a danger of aggression from the Soviet Union.
As Walter Lippmann put it even before the rejection of Britain's
entry bid:
European and American feelings differ about how urgent,
immediate, and earth-shaking is the Soviet challenge. Our European
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allies are not getting ready to call up reserves, and they are much
less hot and bothered about Mr. Khrushchev than we are. . . .
Quite evidently, though as well aware as any man of the challenge from the Soviet Union, General de Gaulle does not consider
it a risk to sidetrack Great Britain, to alienate the Commonwealth,
and to cold shoulder the United States. (New York Herald Tribune,
November 13, 1962.)

And the decision to develop an independent nuclear
capability merely underlines the same point. France's deterrent
power will not be a reality for several years at best. Can even
a schoolboy believe that it has anything to do with fear of an
attack on Western Europe by the USSR? De Gaulle is saying
in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union is no military
threat to anyone. That particular bogey, which in the past has
been such a reliable weapon in the American arsenal, seems
about played out. The consequence should be a world-wide
loosening of the bonds that tie the dependencies of the United
States to the metropolis.
It may be said that our whole argument rests on a shaky
foundation, that the sharp turn events have taken in the last
few months is the work of two old men deluded by dreams of
their countries' past greatness, and that when they have departed
the scene, or perhaps even sooner, everything will revert to
normal: Britain will be admitted to the Common Market and
Europe will slip back into its appointed place in the American
Grand Design. This is certainly the hope of the United States
and, what is more important, there need be no doubt that
Washington will move heaven and earth to see that the hope
comes true.
This line of argument-or for that matter any other that
rests on a personalist interpretation of the Common Market
and its policies-we find completely unconvincing. It is no doubt
true, as we are continuously being told, that de Gaulle is a
power-hungry megalomaniac obsessed with the idea of the
grandeur of France, that he is now the exclusive architect of
French policy, that Adenauer's support has been of crucial importance, and that there is widespread opposition to the two old
autocrats throughout the Common Market. What the argument
neglects to say is that de Gaulle and Adenauer would not be
able to hold the positions and exercise the power they do unless
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they had the backing of the decisive sectors of the French and
German ruling classes. If this is so, as we believe it is, the c.onclusion which follows is that their departure from the scene
is most unlikely to lead to any basic changes in the nature or
policies of the Common Market.
These policies are to gain political and military independence of the United States, build up the power of the group
internally, and expand its possessions and spheres of influence
abroad. It seems to us beyond any question that these are the
policies which the Big Business rulers of France and Germany
have historically pursued whenever they have been in a position
to do so. That they did not for roughly a decade and a half after
World War II was because they were not in a position to, not
because they didn't want to. During that period they were dependent on U. S. economic aid, and they accepted political
and military subordination as its price. By now, however, they
have recovered their economic independence, and it is wholly
natural that they should move to recover their political and
military independence as well. Moreover, their economic
strength, joined to that of their partners in the Six, is ample to
sustain all-around independence and to enable them to con . .
template with equanimity, nay with eagerness, a struggle for
supremacy against the United States. The personal attitudes and
wishes of de Gaulle and Adenauer thus correspond to the objective needs of the classes they represent. It is so with all "great"
historical politicians and statesmen.
What, then, is the source of the opposition to de Gaulle
and Adenauer inside the Common Market? This is an interesting subject which would repay careful study. We would suggest
that there are three main sources.
First, and probably least important, there are segments of
the ruling class, probably relatively small, which stand to lose
from the exclusion of Britain or from other policies now being
adopted (producers selling to the British market, importers of
grain from the U. S. and Canada, etc.).
Second, there are all those who are directly or indirectly
dependent on U. S. private investments in the Common Market
countries. Though, as is well known, U. S. investment in the
area has been rising steeply in recent years, the size and im-
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portance of this group should not be over-estimated. According
to latest available Commerce Department figures, the value of
U. S. direct investments in France in 1961 was $841 million,
in Germany $1,170 million, and in the Common Market as
a whole $3,041 million. These figures compare with $3,523
million in Britain and $11,804 million in Canada. * In other
words, continental Europe is still not an area of extreme U. S.
investment concentration. In relative terms, a well informed
French writer has estimated that U. S. investments in France
account for between 5 and 6 percent of the national total, and
the proportion cannot be significantly different for West Germany or the Market as a whole.** Quite clearly, the apparently widespread notion that the U. S. monopolies through direct
investments have grabbed control of the continental economies
is a myth. (The very much higher concentration in Britain,
incidentally, obviously helps to explain why Washington is so
anxious to shoehorn Britain into the Market.)
The third, and we would judge by far the most important,
source of opposition to the de Gaulle-Adenauer course comes
from the vested political and bureaucratic interests that have
grown up during the years of European subordination to the
United States. Most of Western Europe's leading politicians and
civil servants have climbed to their present positions during this
period. Their most valued skill has been their ability to get
along with and get results from the trans-Atlantic benefactor.
Those infected with anti-Americanism (a varied group to be
sure but certainly including everyone with a strong sense of
personal and national dignity) have been shunted aside or denied promotion. As a result of this process of selection, the
governing elite in Western Europe has acquired a thoroughly
lackeyized mentality: they do not want independence from the
United States, they fear it in much the same way that the ruling
classes in Latin America fear it, and they will do their best to
prevent its realization. It is, above all, this opposition that
de Gaulle and Adenauer must overcome.
*Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "Expansion in U.S . Investments
Abroad," Survey of Current Business, August 1962, p. 22.
**Jacques 1tIalterre, "L'Europe Colonisee," France Observateur,
February 7, 1963.
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There are two main reasons for believing that they will
succeed. In the first place, as already indicated, the great trusts
and combines which are at least as dominant in the European
economies as their counterparts are on this side of the Atlantic,
have every interest in independence from the United States. In
an historical sense, indeed, de Gaulle and Adenauer are merely
their instruments in lifting the yoke of subservience to the United
States which had to be endured during the period of postwar
reconstruction. The conflict between the politicians and bureaucrats on the one hand and the monopoly capitalists on the other
is neatly illustrated by a recent report from Rome by the
columnist Joseph Alsop. Describing the Italian reaction to
de Gaulle's "bold attempt to transform the European Common
Market into an exclusive, protectionist Europe inspired by a
new 'continental nationalism,'" Alsop writes that
the Italian government leaders, from President Segni and Prime
Minister Fanfani down to the able pennanent officials in the
ministries, are completely united in their distaste for the Gaullist
conception of Europe. In the business and industrial communities,
however, support for de Gaulle is already discernible. And this
pro-de Gaulle tendency may grow importantly, especially if it is
aided by clumsy American diplomacy. ( Washington Post., March
6, 1963.)
If this is the case in Italy, how much greater is de Gaulle's
support likely to be in France and Germany which have even
bigger and stronger monopolies as well as deep-rooted traditions
of struggling for world leadership! We would say that this "prode Gaulle tendency" (really a pro-independent imperialist
tendency) is certain to grow, while the opposite tendency, represented by Segni, Fanfani, et aI, is equally certain to decline.
The second main reason for believing in the success of
the de Gaulle-Adenauer line is that it is likely to have genuine
popular support. Nationalism is a two-edged weapon which
operates differently in different situations. If the Common
Market appeared in the eyes of Europeans as a device for
perpetuating the dominance of the United States over its allies,
nationalism would work against it. If, on the other hand, the
Common Market appears as a device for throwing off American
dominance and enhancing the relative standing of the European
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member countries, then nationalism works for it. Since the
de Gaulle-Adenauer policies obviously give the Market the
latter character, it is safe to say that they can rely on nationalist
support. It needs only to be added that Western Europe is the
birthplace of modern nationalism and that there is no habit of
mind that is more deeply ingrained in the European peoples.
Observant reporters have noted that the events of recent months
have already produced a marked change in attitude among
Europeans. Writes Ray Vicker in the Wall Street Journal from
Brussels:
In the red plush interior ,of the Ondres Restaurant near the
Theatre Royal de la Monnaie, a helpful waiter recommends the
lobster entente cordiale to a hungry diner. Says he (in that lordly
manner of European waiters): "It is much better than lobster a
l'Americaine."
That waiter's tone is being adopted by many another Eur.opean
today when referring to American ideas-especially in the field of
diplomatic policy. As a result, President Kennedy's "grand design"
for an Atlantic partnership of Western nations faces rough sledding.
Moreover, even if a grand design materializes, there are increasing
signs that it will not have a made-in-America stamp on it, nor
will the end product be entirely to American liking. (Wall Street
Jourrnal, January 23, 1963.)
If we are right that the de Gaulle-Adenauer policies serve
the interests of the monopolists and express the nationalistic
sentiments of the masses, there can hardly be any doubt that
they will prevail over the pro-Americanism of the hack politicians and the bureaucrats. These gentlemen are either going to
have to accept the new dispensation (which many of them will
manage without too much difficulty) or else be replaced by
others (of whom there are plenty waiting to step forward).
Let us attempt now to survey some of the possible implications of the split in the capitalist world which is now opening
up and in our judgment is certain to grow wider and deeper as
time goes on. This is of course an enormous subject which could
hardly be treated satisfactorily in a volume, let alone a brief
essay. The following remarks should therefore be taken in the
spirit in which they are offered, as suggestions for further
thought and study.
Taking the United States first, we may quote again from
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the article by Ray Vicker in the Wall Street Journal of January
23rd:
For the U. S. that trend [toward an independent Europe]
has some uncomfortable implications. Among them: Possible loss
of a substantial part of its agricultural exports to Europe, tough
bargaining before any trade concessions are won under the administration's Trade Expansion Act, a fierce fight in those negotiations over just about every exception to tariff cutting that may be
advanced by U. S. negotiators to protect specific American industries, possible reorganization of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and continuation of national nuclear forces in the
Western alliance.
This by no means exhausts the list, of course. What is
likely to be of particular importance is an intensified struggle
for dependencies and spheres of influence in the underdeveloped
areas of the world. During the past two decades, the United
States has used its paramount position in the "free world" to
steal one area after another from the older colonial empires
and to add the stolen territories to its own string of dependencies.
In this manner, South Korea, Taiwan, and Okinawa have been
transferred from the Japanese empire to the American, South
Vietnam has been transferred from the French empire, Pakistan
and Iran from the British, and so on. Similarly, British and
German investment and influence, once so prominent in South
America, have been liquidated in some countries and sharply
curtailed in others. With the re-establishment of a strong and
independent imperialist power in Europe, however, this process
of one-way transfers is likely to be halted and even reversed.
The Congo perhaps offers us a preview of what is in store in
other countries and continents. It probably requires no elaborate
argument to prove that the Tshombe-Adoula struggle was at
bottom a struggle of the Belgians to hold on to the extremely
lucrative Katanga mining complex against the bold bid of the
United States to use the UN to bring the whole Congo into the
American sphere of influence. The fall of Tshombe seemed to
signalize a resounding victory for the United States. And yet
one of Adoula's first acts after this military denouement was
to accept an invitation to visit Brussels. The resulting talks are
said to have ended in "complete success. . . . A joint com-
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munique was issued after the last meeting between the Congolese
Ministers and a Belgian delegation headed by Premier Theo
Lefevre and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. It said the
talks had been conducted 'in a particularly cordial atmosphere'
and had revealed 'a complete similarity of views between both
governments.'" (New York Times) Western Edition, March 1,
1963.) Belgium, it seems, is now seeking to buy Adoula out
from under the Americans' noses, and with the wealth of
Katanga still firmly in its grasp the chances of success would
appear to be very favorable. Adoula evidently has every interest
in playing the two off against each other with a view to finally
selling out to the highest bidder. (The Congolese people of
course have nothing but misery to gain from all this haggling
over the right to exploit them, but their welfare is the last thing
that any of the principals involved are concerned with.)
Be that as it may, a world-wide struggle for empire is
clearly in the offing, and the United States, having had everything its way for two decades, is pretty sure to suffer some defeats and losses. At the same time, the price of local ruling
groups will go up: competition among buyers, they say, always has the effect of ensuring a fairer price to sellers. All of
which, it may be surmised, will not do much to solve the U. S.
balance-of-payments problem or to stimulate a lagging domestic
economy sorely in need of expanded overseas "living space."
What about Britain? To begin with, one must understand
that the door to the Common Market is by no means permanently closed to the British. As de Gaulle made quite clear
at his January 14th press conference, they can enter any time
they are ready to give up their special relation with the United
States. In other words, they can enter if and when the effect of
their entrance would be to strengthen the Common Market
rather than transform it. The basic condition for such an entry
is clear: cut all bilateral military ties to the U. S. and pool
nuclear capabilities and research with those of the continental
partners. The British would also have to bring as large a part
of their remaining empire as possible into the Market on an
associate membership basis like that · now held by most of
France's ex-colonies in Africa. But there is no point in speculating
further about this at the present time since it is perfectly clear
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that the one thing the British are not prepared to do is give up
their position as most favored ally of the United States.
From this premise certain consequences flow. As the struggle between the U. S. and the Common Market intensifies,
Britain will inevitably be squeezed from both sides. Both will
try to take away her markets and colonies (or neo-colonies),
and as her situation deteriorates, she will be thrown into ever
closer dependence on the United States. At some stage along
this gloomy route British Big Business might decide that it
would be better after all to throw in their country's lot with the
Market. It is hard to see what other alternatives are now open
to Britain. The idea of turning the Commonwealth into an independent (and liberal) third force in the "free world" is totally
impractical, the more so since large parts of the Commonwealth
are already under American domination (for example, Canada
and Pakistan) and even larger parts appear to be in the process
of falling under American domination (for example, India and
Nigeria). The Commonwealth is much more likely to provide
battlegrounds between the American and European empires
than to form the basis of a British-led third force. If the Labor
Party were a real socialist party, it might be able to lead Britain
into the socialist camp where the country would enjoy independence of both capitalist empires and could in addition find
all the markets needed for rapid economic growth. But the
Labor Party is not now a real socialist party and the day when
it may become one is still apparently a long way off.
As for the underdeveloped countries in the "free world,"
one must make a distinction. We have already suggested in
connection with the Congo that the ruling groups can play
the imperialist powers off against each other and thereby extract better terms for themselves. As far as the masses are concerned, however, it makes hardly any difference whether they
are exploited by Americans or Europeans, and it matters just as
little whether the local agents of the imperialists are paid better
or worse. If the masses are able to win genuine concessions, as
sometimes they are, the reason is their own strength and
militancy, not the competition of the imperialists for their favor.
Imperialist rivalry is after all nothing new, and so far as we
know there is not a single case in which it can be shown to have
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benefited the people in the exploited lands. Rather the contrary: they are usually made to pay, in one way or another,
the costs of deciding who is to have the privilege of battening
off their misery.
This does not mean that it is a matter of indifference to
the peoples of the underdeveloped countries whether the imperialists are united or divided. Their real hope, their only real
hope, is to escape altogether from the clutches of imperialism
and to join the socialist world. Hence anything that weakens
imperialism as a whole is good for them: their escape becomes
that much easier. And anything that strengthens the socialist
world is also good for them: more assistance can be given them
both along the escape route and after they have reached their
destination. It will probably be generally agreed that an imperialist system divided against itself is weaker than one united
under a single leader and that on this count therefore, recent
developments are altogether favorable to the real interests of
the underdeveloped countries. That the split in the imperialist
camp will actually strengthen world socialism, however, is less
obvious. Still, we believe that it is both true and important.
For one thing, the rift between the imperialist giants should
serve materially to lessen the purely military pressure on the
socialist countries. In more concrete terms, to the extent that
West Germany gets caught up in a struggle against the United
States for markets and spheres of influence, her attitude toward
her neighbors to the East is bound to be affected. Germany
has twice suffered military disaster as a result of fighting twofront wars. Left to itself, the German ruling class might make
the same mistake again, but there is less likelihood that the
integrated ruling class of a Western European empire will do
so. Its orientation will be more toward the Iberian peninsula in
Europe and toward Africa and Latin America overseas. Under
these circumstances, the working out of some sort of modus
vivendi in Central Europe would become a realistic possibility.
With the threat of German aggression thus reduced, the socialist
countries of Eastern Europe could divert resources from military
to civilian uses and in this way step up their rate of growth.
Analagous considerations apply in the field of economic
relations between capitalist Europe and socialist Europe. It is
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well known that Western European capitalists (including Germans) have few if any scruples about trading with the East
and that it has been American influence that has prevented
them from doing so on a much larger scale. With the restraining
grip of the Americans broken, this trade should flourish, to the
great benefit of both sides. For the Western Europeans, this
may well become a crucially important matter in the next few
years. Their present boom, like all capitalist booms, rests on
overproduction of capital goods. When creeping stagnation sets
in, as it did in the United States already during the 50's,* the
pressure of the big monopolies to open up new markets wiIl
steadily mount. In part, this will take the form of intensified
struggle against the Americans. But it wiIl also take the form of
increased trading with the East, probably on more and more
advantageous terms for the latter. That this will facilitate the
rapid development of the socialist societies, not only in Europe
but on all other continents as well, goes without saying.
For the socialist world, then, the implications of the imperialist split are all favorable. And this means that for the
peoples of the underdeveloped countries the implications are
also favorable. But no one should misinterpret this statement.
It does not mean that the peoples of the underdeveloped countries can expect any immediate or direct benefits from the
quarrels of their imperialist masters. In the short run, indeed,
they may suffer, as the Congolese have suffered during the
last three years. What it does mean is that the conditions for
overthrowing imperialist rule altogether are improving and will
continue to improve. Weare clearly reaching a stage of world
history when, for the poor and exploited who make up the vast
majority of mankind, no other goal makes sense and therefore
no other goal is worth striving for.
(March 17, 1963)
*Much of the European Left has succumbed to the view that "neocapitalism" is no longer subject to such ills. The Right has retained a better
sense of proportion, as shown by the example of the arch-conservative
Swedish economist Per Jacobsson, managing director of the International
Monetary Fund: "Western Europe," he told a convention of the American
Bankers Association, "is going to encounter more problems like those of the
United States than it has in recent years." (New York Times, Western
Edition, February 26, 1963.)
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The Review of the Month in the December, 1961, issue of
MR was on the subject of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then a
lot has happened, and a large amount of new or previously
relatively inaccessible material has been published. * In the light
of these developments, we have to Say quite frankly that our
earlier analysis of the dispute does not stand up. It contains
serious inaccuracies, the emphases are misplaced, and it now
seems to us that the conclusions are untenable. But much more
serious, the whole argument rested on a misconception of what
the dispute is all about.
What the Dispute Is About
It is not about whether war is inevitable or how to minimize
the danger of war or what the relations among Communist
Parties should be-though these and many other questions are
involved r At bottom it is about the nature of the historical period
through which the world is passing and what can and should be
done to advance the cause of world socialism.
The Russians and those who agree with them (including
the leadership of most of the non-Asian Communist Parties)
think that the over-riding issue of our time is war or peace, and
that by comparison everything else is of secondary importance.
If thermonuclear war comes, they argue, civilization itself will
be destroyed or at any rate set back hundreds if not thousands
of years, and the bright future which now seems to beckon the
socialist countries will be ruined. On the other hand if war can

* The following sources are particularly valuable: ( 1) Donald S.
Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, Princeton, 1962. This book
quotes from or summarizes the most important documents on both sides
from the 20th Congress through the 22nd Congress of the CPUSSR. (2)
Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today, New York,
1962. This 810-page work, perhaps the best general account of revolutionary China to date, throws valuable light on the motivations and ideas
of the Chinese leaders. (3) The following statements published by the
Chinese CP: "The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us,"
Renmin Ribao, December 31, 1962; "Whence the Differences: A Reply
to Thorez and Other Comrades," Renmin Ribao, February 27, 1963; and
"More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us: Some
Important Problems of Leninism in the Contemporary World," H ongqi,
March 4, 1963. The last named is in fact a book of 199 pages which
contains a detailed and authoritative statement of Chinese views. All of
these, as well as other statements on the dispute, have been published
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be avoided, the superiority of socialism over capitalism will be
clearly demonstrated within a decade or two and the whole
world will be irresistibly attracted into the socialist camp.
The political line which follows from this analysis puts
primary emphasis on three objectives: peaceful coexistence of
countries with different social systems, disarmament, and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. These are treatedfor example, in the new program of the CPUSSR adopted at the
22nd Congress in October, 1961-not merely as desirable but as
actually attainable goals. This is a crucially important distinction
which must be continuously kept in mind. The dispute in the
socialist camp concerns not the desirability of these goals but
their attainability, and attainability depends on reality not on
wishes.
War and Imperialism
The Chinese, for their part, are emphatic in their espousal
of a policy of peaceful coexistence. "The Chinese Communist
Party and the Chinese government," we read in the first reply
to Togliatti, "have always stood for peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems." (Differences, p.
22.) And again: "A socialist country has no antagonistic social
contradictions . . . and it is absolutely unnecessary and impermissible for a socialist country to embark on wars of expansion. No world war can ever be started by a socialist country."
(More on the Differences, p. 66.) But they are no less emphatic
in their insistence that imperialism does not stand for peaceful
coexistence, that imperialism is full of antagonistic social contradictions, that it is in the nature of imperialism to embark on
wars of expansion, and that imperialism can start a world war.
These are, indeed, among the most basic tenets of Leninism,
and they have been fully confirmed by history. Imperialist
separately by the Foreign Languages Press, Peking. In what follows,
references are to these separate editions, identified by short titles. On the
Soviet side, many articles and speeches could be cited. Perhaps the best
single source is Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on December
12, 1962, entitled "The Present International Situation and the Foreign
Policy of the Soviet Union," published as a separate pamphlet by Crosscurrents Press, New York.
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conflict has already been responsible for starting two world
w.ars, and "the history of the 17 postwar years shows that local
wars of one kind or another have never ceased." (Differences,
p. 25.) In the three years 1960-1962 alone, the Chinese enumerate some 20 local wars or acts of imperialist aggression. (M ore
on the Differences, pp. 60-63.) The conclusion follows with
iron logic that "only after the imperialist system has been overthrown and only after all systems of oppression of man by man
and of exploitation of man by man have been abolished, and
not before, will it be possible to eliminate all wars and to reach
'a world without war.'" (Differences, p. 25.) To believe otherwise is not Leninism but bourgeois pacifism.
This does not mean the Chinese think that a third world
war is inevitable, still less that the world is going to be blown
up in a thermonuclear holocaust. On these questions, as distinct
from banning war altogether, they are even quite optimistic.
Their reasoning, reduced to its essentials, is that just as the first
two world wars resulted in vast losses of territory and population to imperialism, so a third world war would finish the job,
wiping imperialism off the face of the earth. If the forces
opposed to imperialism and war can be effectively mobilized and
the imperialists can be convinced that to start another world
w.ar would be suicide, they can be deterred from doing it. With
respect to atomic warfare, the Chinese hold that since "the
secret of nuclear weapons has long since ceased to be a monopoly," it follows that "those who possess nuclear weapons and
guided missiles cannot prevent other countries from possessing
the same. In their vain hope of obliterating their opponents with
nuclear weapons, the imperialists are, in fact, subjecting themselves to the danger of being obliterated." Therefore, "we have
always maintained that it is possible to conclude an agreement
for a total ban on nuclear weapons." (More on the Differences,
p. 73.) And they call attention to the fact that "there are
precedents for the oudawing of highly destructive weapons. One
such precedent is the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, concluded by various nations in 1925 at Geneva." (Differences, pp. 13-14.) But of
course the possibility of avoiding a third world war or of out-

22

MONTHLY REVIEW

lawing nuclear weapons is an entirely different matter from banning war altogether. That will be possible only after imperialism
has been completely eliminated.
To be sure, if the nature of imperialism had changed or if
it were in the process of changing, this conclusion would no
longer hold. But the Chinese contend that the changes which
have taken place in imperialism, and in particular the decline
of the old colonial empires, have in no way changed the nature
of the beast. The United States has stepped into the shoes of the
formerly dominant imperialist powers and "is carrying out a
policy of expansion in all parts of the world ever since World
War II." (More on the Differences) p. 27.) But this in no way
affects the contradictions of the system. On the contrary:
The U.S. imperialist policy of world hegemony inevitably
intensifies the fight between the imperialist powers and between
the new and old colonialists over colonies and spheres of influence;
it also intensifies the struggles between U.S. imperialism with its
policy of control and the other imperialist powers which are resisting this control. These struggles affect the vital interests of
imperialism, and the imperialist contestants give each other no
quarter, for each side is striving to strangle the other.
The policy of the U.S. imperialists and their partners towards
the oppressed nations and people of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America who are struggling for their own liberation is an extremely
reactionary policy of suppression and deception. . . .
The population of these areas in Asia, Mrica, and Latin
America constitutes more than two thirds of the total population
of the capitalist world. The ever-mounting tide of revolution in
these areas and the fight over them between the imperialist powers
and between the new and old colonialists clearly show that these
areas are the focus of all the contradictions of the capitalist world;
it may also be said that they are the focus of world contradictions.
These areas are the weakest link in the imperialist chain and the
storm center of world revolution.* (Ibid.) pp. 31-32.)

* It is important to understand that in saying that "these areas are
the focus of world contradictions," the Chinese definitely mean to include
the contradictions between the capitalist and socialist systems. "In terms
of the actual interests of the imperialist powers," they say in another
passage, "these contradictions [in Asia, Africa, and Latin America] are more
pressing, more direct, more immediate than their contradictions with the
socialist countries." Ibid., p. 50.
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The Chances of Disarmament

In these circumstances, the Chinese evidently think that the
prospects of any genuine disarmament are vanishingly small, so
small indeed that they hardly bother to discuss the problem at
all. In More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and
Us, which is unquestionably their major theoretical pronouncement, disarmament is brought up at only one place in the chapter
on "War and Peace" and is quickly disposed of:
That old-line opportunist Kautsky held that "war is a product
of the arms drive," and that "if there is a will to reach agreement
on disarmament," it "will eliminate one of the most serious causes
of war." Lenin sharply criticized these anti-Marxist views of Kautsky and other old-line opportunists who examined the causes of
war without reference to the social system and the system of
exploitation.
In "The War Program of the Proletarian Revolution," Lenin
pointed out that "only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission,
to throw all armaments on the scrap heap; and the proletariat
will undoubtedly do this, but only when this condition has been
fulfilled, certainly not before.)) Such is the law of social development, and it cannot be otherwise.
Being incapable of explaining the question of war and peace
from the historical and class angle, the modern revisionists always
talk about peace and about war in general terms without making
any distinction between just and unjust wars. Some people are
trying to persuade others that the people's liberation would be
"incomparably easier" after general and complete disarmament,
when the oppressors would have no weapons in their hand's. In
our opinion this is nonsensical 'a nd totally unrealistic and is putting
the cart before the horse.* (Ibid., pp. 67-68. Emphasis in.original.)

This low estimate of the chances of disarmament does not
mean that the Chinese oppose the socialist countries' taking the

* The reference may be to Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan who
was reported in the New York Times of March 15, 1962, as saying in a
speech in Armenia that he "rejected the thesis that Mr. Khrushchev's
disarmament proposals would hamper the national liberation movements.
The Deputy Premier ... said that disarmament would strip the 'imperialists' of the means of 'resisting the revolutionary actions of the proletariat
and the peasantry.''' This very consequence of disarmament serves to
explain why, in the Chinese view, Mr. Khrushchev's proposals are "totally
unrealistic."
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initiative in proposing disarmament: not to do so would be to
abandon an effective propaganda weapon. But the Chinese
evidently believe that to rely on disarmament as a means of
promoting or insuring peace makes no sense. The threat of war
comes not from armaments as such but from imperialism and
can be countered only by fighting imperialism. Hence where the
Soviet Union's political line centers on the struggle for peace and
disarmament, that of the Chinese centers on the struggle against
imperialism.
How to Fight Imperialism

How should the struggle against imperialism be carried on?
The Chinese answer that it must be conducted on all levels and
by all available methods. But since, as we have seen, they regard
the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Mrica, and Latin America
as "the weakest link in the imperialist chain," they naturally
conclude that the key to a successful fight against imperialism
is to be found in the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of
those areas. Since this is the real heart of the Chinese position
and the central issue in their dispute with the Soviet Union, a
full statement of their views seems called for:
A fundamental task is thus set before the international Communist movement in the contemporary world, namely, to support
the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, because these struggles are decisive for the cause of the international proletariat as a whole. In
a sense, the revolutionary cause of the international proletariat as
a whole hinges on the outcome of the people's struggles in these
regions, which are inhabited by the overwhelming majority of the
world's population, as well as on the acquisition of support from
these revolutionary struggles.
The revolutionary struggles in Asia, Mrica, and Latin America
cannot be suppressed. They are bound to burst forth. Unless the
proletarian parties in these regions lead these struggles, they will
become divorced from the people and' fail to win their confidence.
The proletariat has very many allies in the anti-imperialist struggle
in these regions. Therefore ... the proletariat and its vanguard ...
must march in the van . . . and be skillful in organizing their allies
in a broad anti-imperialist and anti-feudal united front, exposing
every deception practiced by the imperialists, the reactionaries, and
the modern revisionists, and leading the struggle in the correct
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direction. Unless all these things are done, victory in the revolutionary struggle will be impossible, and even if victory is won, its
consolidation will be impossible and the fruits of victory may fall
into the hands of the reactionaries, with the country and the
nation once again coming under imperialist enslavement. Experience, past and present, abounds in instances of how the people
have been betrayed in the revolutionary struggle, the defeat of the
Chinese Revolution in 1927 being a significant example.
The proletariat of the capitalist countries in Europe and
America, too, must stand in the forefront of those supporting the
revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations and people of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. In fact, such support simultaneously
helps the cause of the emancipation of the proletariat in Europe
and America. . . . Therefore the proletarian parties of the metropolitan imperialist countries are duty bound to heed the voice of
the revolutionary people in these regions, study their experience,
respect their revolutionary feelings, and support their revolutionary
struggles .... It should be understood that according to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, without a correct stand, line, and
policy on the nationalli:beration movement and the people's revolutionary movement in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, it will be impossible for the workers' parties in the
metropolitan imperialist countries to have a correct stand, line,
and policy on the struggle waged by the working class and the
broad masses of the people in their own countries.
The national liberation movement and the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America give great
support to the socialist countries; they constitute an extremely
important force safeguarding the socialist countries from imperialist
invasion. Beyond any doubt, the socialist countries should give
warm sympathy and active support to these movements and they
absolutely must not adopt a perfunctory or a selfishly national
attitude, or an attitude of great-power chauvinism, much less
hamper, obstruct, mislead, or sabotage these movements. Those
countries in which socialism has been victorious must make it their
sacred internationalist duty to support the national liberation
struggles and the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries.
Some people take the view that such support is but a one-sided
"burden" on the socialist countries. This view is very wrong and
runs counter to Marxism-Leninism. It must be understood that
such support is a two-way, mutual affair; the socialist countries
support the people's revolutionary struggles in other countries,
and these struggles in turn serve to support and defend the socialist
countries. (More on the Differences, pp. 45-47.)

Revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries
thus constitute the crucial factor in the all-important struggle
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against imperialism. Proletarian parties must correctly lead these
movements so as to prevent the kind of disastrous setback the
Chinese Revolution suffered in 1927. The Left in the capitalist
countries must understand and support these movements. And
finally the socialist countries must provide them with all possible
backing, not only as a matter of international solidarity but
bec.ause this is the best way of weakening their own mortal
enemy. As to the outlook, the Chinese are full of revolutionary
optimism. "The present situation," they say, "is an excellent one
for the people of the world. It is most favorable for the oppressed
nations and people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for the
proletariat and working people of the capitalist countries, for
the socialist countries, and for the cause of world peace; it is
unfavorable only for the imperialists and the reactionaries in all
countries and for the forces of aggression and war." (More on
the Differences, pp. 48-49.) The Chinese Communists carried
out a successful fight of their own against imperialism and reactionaries despite seemingly insuperable odds; they believe that
conditions are now much more favorable and that similar
victories can be won by the other oppressed and exploited
peoples of the world.
Peaceful Competition and Peaceful Transition

Nothing in all this should be taken to imply that the
Chinese deny or minimize the importance of socialist successes
in the economic competition with capitalism as a factor in promoting the world revolution. They stress that "the superiority of
the socialist system as demonstrated in the socialist countries is
a source of great inspiration to the oppressed people and nations," and quote Lenin approvingly as saying that "it is by our
economic policy that we are exerting our main influence on the
international revolution." They then go on to say, however:
But Lenin never said that the building of a Soviet state could
take the place of the struggles of all countries to liberate themselves. Historical events during the 40 years and more of the
Soviet Union's existence also show that a revolution or a transformation of the social system in any country is a matter for the
people of that country, and that the policy of peaceful coexistence
and peaceful competition followed by socialist countries cannot
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possibly result in a change of the social system in any other country.
What grounds have Togliatti and other comrades for believing
that the pursuit of the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful
competition by the socialist countries can change the face of the
social system in every other country and establish an "economic and
social order" capable of satisfying all the aspirations of men? (More
on the Differences, p. 17.)
The Chinese position, in other words, is that peaceful
competition may spur revolutions in the nonsocialist countries
but can never be a substitute for them.
What about the possibilities of peaceful transition from
capitalism to socialism? The Chinese subscribed to the Moscow
Declaration (1957) and the Moscow Statement (1960) of the
world's Communist Parties, both of which documents assert the
possibility of such a peaceful transition; but it is apparent that
they do not have very high hopes in this regard and that they
consider exclusive reliance on peaceful methods of struggle to be
dangerous in the extreme. "It would naturally be in the interests
of the proletariat and the entire people if peaceful transition
could be realized," they say. But "possibility and reality, the
wish and its fulfillment, are two different things." Moreover,
up to now, "history has not witnessed a single example of
peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." Still more
im portan't :
Even when it is possible to secure state power through peaceful
means, one must be prepared to deal immediately with armed
intervention by foreign imperialists and with counter-revolutionary
armed rebellions supported by the imperialists. Communists should
concentrate their attention on the accumulation of revolutionary
strength through painstaking efforts and must be ready to fight
back against armed attacks by the bourgeoisie whenever necessary.
They should not lay one-sided stress on peaceful transition and
concentrate their 'a ttention on this possibility; otherwise they are
bound to benumb the revolutionary will of the proletariat, disarm
themselves ideologically, be utterly passive and unprepared politically and organizationally, and end up by burying the cause of the
proletarian revolution. (Differences) pp. 35-36.)
In the final analysis, then, the question of peaceful transition
is seen to involve the struggle against imperialism. This is the
starting point and the ending point of every meaningful discussion of socialist policy in the world of today. But can a
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militant struggle against imperialism, such as the Chinese advocate and support, be carried out without provoking a third
world war with all its catastrophic consequences?
Nuclear Weapons and Paper Tigers ·

The Chinese answer to this question is not spelled out in
any detail. They simply say, in effect, that the struggle against
imperialism helps to defend peace, not to provoke war. Presumably some such reasoning as the following underlies this
belief. Nuclear weapons are totally irrelevant to the combatting
of guerrilla war and other fonTIS of popular struggle, and these
are bound to be the main fonTIS of conflict between imperialism
and the revolutionary forces in the underdeveloped countries.
And the Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" against the
socialist countries because of their moral and/or material support
of the revolutionaries is a recipe for suicide. Even Dulles himself was unable to persuade the U.S. government to apply the
doctrine at the time of Dienbienphu, and with the power of the
socialist countries to retaliate against any attack on them growing
all the time, the doctrine is still less likely to be applied in the
future. In the meantime, the revolutionary struggle weakens
imperialism by liberating one country after another, a process
which intensifies all the contradictions of the system and will
eventually set the stage for its overthrow in the metropolitan
centers themselves.
This reasoning might seem to imply that the socialist
countries can afford to go to any lengths to support revolutionary
struggles in Asia, Mrica, and Latin America; and the Chinese
are in fact accused by their opponents of taking this position.
In order to evaluate this accusation, one must understand and
take account of two well publicized Chinese doctrines-"despise
the enemy strategically, take him seriously tactically" and "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers."
The "p.aper tiger" doctrine is really nothing but a metaphorical way of stating one of the most elementary and least
controversial propositions of orthodox Marxism, that the decline
of capitalism and its replacement by socialism on a world scale
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are both inevitable. In an historic.al sense, therefore, the defenders of the capitalist system are powerless, they are paper
tigers. And this is the enemy which should be despised strategically, the tenn "strategically" in this context meaning both "in
the long run" and "as a whole." Taken together, the "despise
the enemy strategically" and "paper tiger" doctrines are thus
simply the Chinese way of saying what Marxists have been
saying to the downtrodden and exploited for a long time: do
not be overawed and cowed by the apparent might of your
oppressors; their fate has already been sealed by history; join
the battle now and hasten their downfall and your own liberation.
Man-eating Tigers

All of this, however, has nothing to do with the actual
conduct of the battle, the "tactical" aspect in the Chinese tenninology. Here there are no paper tigers to be despised. Everything
in the world, according to Mao Tse-tung, has a dual nature.
"Imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from
a long-tenn point of view, from a strategic point of view, must
be seen for what they are-paper tigers." But this is only one
side of their nature. "On the other hand, they are also living
tigers, iron tigers, real tigers which can eat people." (M ore on
the Differences, p. 141, quoting Mao.) And these real maneating tigers are the ones that have to be fought against in
everyday battle. Hence the principle: Take the enemy seriously
tactically.
What this means in more concrete terms of course depends
on particular circumstances. But it is certainly no recipe for
irresponsible adventurism, and the record shows that the Chinese
have been as cautious as any other major power in ~heir conduct
of foreign relations. While claiming their undoubted legal right
to liberate Taiwan, they have taken no military steps to do so
and have even refrained from occupying the offshore islands
despite their use as sabotage and espionage bases; they have
tolerated the colonies of Hong Kong and Macao on Chinese
soil, waiting to solve these problems "until the time is ripe";
repeated charges in the U.S. press of Chinese military inter-
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vention in Laos and Vietnam seem to be without foundation;*
and farther away from home, in Algeria and Cuba for example,
the Chinese have given their full moral !mpport to revolutionary
forces and have provided as much economic aid as they could
manage but have been careful to avoid actions which could be
considered provocative. At the same time, where they have felt
that China itself was directly menaced or attacked, as in North
Korea in 1950 and on the Indian border from 1959 on, the
Chinese have not hesitated to strike back hard in self-defense.
But what about the Chinese attitude in the Cuban crisis of
last October? Was that not provocative? If China instead of the
Soviet Union had been pitted against the United States, is there
not a good chance that the world would already have gone up
in thermonuclear flames? The Chinese answer to these questions
is an emphatic negative. In the first place, they were s~rongly
opposed to the introduction of missiles into Cuba; in their view,
it was an adventurist act which simply played into the hands
of the United States imperialists. The real deterrents to a U.S.
attack on Cuba must be the will of the Cuban people to fight
to the death, the condemnation of world opinion, the wrath
of Latin America; and with respect to these deterrents the
missiles could not but do more harm than good. In the second
place, the Chinese were definitely not opposed to removing
the missiles. What they were against was removing the missiles
without consulting the Cubans, and agreeing to unilateral inspection by the UN-in short, they were against making a deal
with imperialism at the expense of another nation's sovereignty.
There is nothing in all this to indicate an adventurist or warlike
policy on the part of the Chinese. On the contrary, it is clear

* This particular accusation has been made so often and so emphatically that it may be as well to quote a person who should know the
facts if anyone should and who certainly has no motive to cover up for the
Chinese. In a press conference in Saigon recently, General Paul D.
Harkins, head of the U. S. military forces in South Vietnam, briefed
reporters on the situation in South Vietnam. According to the account
in the Washington Post (March 6): "Harkins said the guerrillas obviously are not being reinforced or supplied systematically from North
Vietnam, China, or any place else. He said they apparently depend for
weapons primarily on whatever they can capture. Many of their weapons,
he said, are homemade."
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that if Mao had been in Khrushchev's place there would have
been no missile crisis to begin with, and the Cuban crisis, if it
had occurred, would have taken a quite different form.
Reform vs. Revolution
There is one other issue which has figured prominently in
the polemics between the Chinese and their opponents, the
question of "structural reform" versus proletarian revolution for
the countries of advanced capitalism. For anyone who has read
the literature of previous "great debates" between reformists and
revolutionaries, especially Lenin's famous tracts of 1917 and
1918, State and Revolution and The Proletarian Revolution and
the Renegade Kautsky, this new exchange has a very familiar
sound. Just as Lenin in his day saw it as his first duty to revive
and restate the true doctrines of Marx on the then burning
issues of state and revolution, so now the Chinese see it as their
responsibility to recall to the "modern revisionists" what Lenin
himself said and stood for and to demonstrate that their "new"
ideas are really not new at all and are as much at odds with
the ideas of Marx and Lenin as were Kautsky's a half century
ago. This is not the place for a discussion of the theory of
"structural reform" now being propounded by Togliatti (as
well as by various other, Communist and non-Communist,
theorists in Western Europe). For present purposes, it is enough
to point out that the Chinese position on the questions at issue
is strictly orthodox Marxism-Leninism.
The Mantle of Lenin
One can, indeed, go further and say that on the whole
range of subjects under dispute between the two sides, the
Chinese arguments are purely Leninist in spirit even if not always in form (tigers, real or paper, are after all not a Russian
specialty). The Russians and their followers, by comparison,
are undoubtedly the modern revisionists the Chinese describe
them as. And this accounts for one of the most striking aspects
of the whole controversy.
For reasons which we can only touch on here, Khrushchev
and his associates have a great need to wear the ideological
mantle of Lenin. By brusquely dethroning Stalin, they breached
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the continuity of Soviet development and in a sense called into
question the legitimacy of their own leadership. They therefore
need to reach back, as it were, and attempt to establish a more
basic continuity by showing that they are the real heirs of
Lenin while Stalin was a sort of impostor. The Khrushchevian
style is thus to pay homage to Lenin whenever a suitable opportunity presents itself, while relegating Stalin to a limbo of
silence even in respect to matters where he was a faithful disciple
of Lenin or where the weight of his authority might be most
useful to Khrushchev.
Now along come the Chinese with their overwhelming proof
that Khrushchev's ideas and the political line he bases on them
are not Leninist at all and in fact have more in common with
the ideas and line of the people on whom Lenin focused his
attacks just before and after the Soviet state was born. If Khrushchev and his associates could answer the Chinese and make out
a plausible case that they and not the Chinese are the true
interpreters of Lenin, that would be one thing. But this would
obviously be a hopeless undertaking: any rational debate with
the Chinese could only do more harm than good. The result
is a good deal of misrepresentation and distortion of the Chinese
position. The Chinese are accused of wanting to advance the
cause of socialism through world war, of advocating and practicing adventurist foreign policies, of stirring up premature revolts,
of ignorance of conditions outside their own country, and so on
and so forth. All of these charges are false, as anyone who
knows the history of the recent past and takes the trouble to
read the relevant Chinese literature can easily verify. In order to
keep their own people from learning the truth of the matter, the
Soviet leadership is therefore forced to suppress the replies of
the Chinese to the accusations made against them. The contrast
between the Chinese policy of publishing both sides of the
debate and the Russian policy of publishing only one side tells
a great deal about the debate itself. * "Since you are quite

* One of the saddest features of the situation is the extent to which
able leaders like Khrushchev and Togliatti, not to mention lesser figures,
have thrown dialectical and historical materialism to the winds and have
put in its place the most commonplace kind of pragmatism. But this is too
large a subject to discuss within the framework of the present paper.
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definite that our articles are wrong," say the Chinese to their
opponents, "why don't you publish all these erroneous articles
and then refute them point by point, so as to inculcate hatred
among your people against the 'heresies' you call dogmatism,
sectarianism, and anti-Marxism-Leninism? Why do you lack the
courage to do this? Why such a stringent embargo? You fear
the truth." (More on the Differences, p. 194.) It is, alas, hard
to think of another reason.
Relations among Communist Parties

The controversy of course involves the question of relations
among Communist parties. Even in the days of the Third International when no member party would have dreamed of openly
challenging Soviet leadership, the Chinese were quietly going
their own way; and after the Second W orId War they directly
defied Stalin's advice to enter a coalition dominated by Chiang
Kai-shek. As Stalin himself later admitted, they were right and
he was wrong. As a result of these experiences, the Chinese are
used to being in a minority and have never been under the
spell of the doctrine of Soviet infallibility, facts which help to
explain their present stand. All Communist parties, in the Chinese
view, are equal and none can presume to dictate to others. This
does not exclude a party's voluntarily following the "baton" if
it wants to (the "baton" is their euphemism for the Soviet line),
but none is obliged to. The only line binding on all parties is
that laid down in documents such as the Moscow Declaration
and the Moscow Statement to which all have put their signatures. (Since each party interprets these documents as it wishes,
it is clear that in practice the commitment to abide by them
means little.) The Russians, on the other hand, while they have
given up any claim to exclusive leadership, argue that all parties
ought to accept the views of the majority. This the Chinese
deny, supporting their position with one of the classical doctrines
of bourgeois democracy. What matters, they say, is not a majority
but the truth; a minority which takes a principled stand for the
truth will in due course become a majority. For their part, they
have not the slightest doubt that they represent the truth and
that time is on their side. As for the modern revisionists who are
betraying Marxism-Leninism, "Let them go on creating trouble
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if they must. The masses, and history, will pass judgment on
them." (Mor~ on th, DifflTences, p. 193.)
The Causes of Revisionism

On the main issue in the controversy-whether the struggle
for peace or the struggle against imperialism should take priority
-we are convinced that the Chinese do indeed have the truth
on their side. Real peace will never be achieved, much less
guaranteed, as long as imperialism exists. And we are also
convinced that the Chinese are right that imperialism can and
will suffer decisive defeats at the hands of the revolutionary
peoples of the underdeveloped countries. Weare by no means
so sure as the Chinese seem to be, however, that the fact of their
being right on these crucial questions means that sooner or later
the whole international socialist movement will come around
to their position. It is impossible to form a worthwhile opinion
about this without an understanding of the causes of modern
revisionism, and here unfortunately the Chinese have little to
offer.
Revisionism, according to the Chinese, is "bourgeois ideology which has infiltrated into the ranks of the workers." (More
on the Differences, p. 4.) And the vehicle for this infiltration
is the aristocracy of labor: "Revisionism represents the interests
of the labor aristocracy, and hence also the interests of the reactionary bourgeoisie." But all forms of revisionism "run counter
to the interests of the proletariat, of the masses of the people, and
of all oppressed people and nations." Therefore:
One after the other, all the revisionists and opportunists who
challenged revolutionary Marxism-Leninism have collapsed in the
face of the truth and have been spumed by the people.... Those
who are launching the new attacks on revolutionary MarxismLeninism today are just as overbearing and arrogant; yet, if they
continue to tum a deaf ear to all advice and persist in their wrong
course, it can be said for certain that their end will be no better
than that of the old revisionists and opportunists. (Ibid., pp. 192193.)

This theory of revisionism is, like Chinese Communist
thought in general, pure Leninism. But unlike most of Lenin's
ideas, it has failed to stand the test of time. Lenin tried to use
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the theory to explain Social Democratic attitudes and policies
in his day: he regarded Social Democracy as the creation of a
small labor aristocracy which managed to attract a mass following through deceit and demagogy. This became the basis of the
policies of Communist Parties in all the countries where Social
Democracy was strong. But these policies never worked, for the
simple reason that the Social Democrats and not the Communists
expressed what the workers themselves felt to be their real
interests. The workers, in other words, were not revolutionaries
at heart, and no amount of exhortation by the Communists
could tum them into revolutionaries. Gradually, the Communist
parties, though continuing to use revolutionary phraseology, adjusted themselves to this fact, becoming in practice reformist
parties much like the Social Democrats. What is happening now,
with Togliatti and the Italian CP in the lead, is simply that
the Communist parties of the advanced capitalist countries are
taking the last step along this road by openly embracing a
reformist ideology.
But this is not the only respect in which the Chinese theory
of revisionism falls down. After all, the fountainhead of "modern
revisionism" is not Togliatti, nor is it Tito, even if the Chinese
often accord the latter pride of place; it is Khrushchev and his
fellow-leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Does
it make sense to speak of bourgeois influence penetrating the
ranks of the Soviet workers through a labor aristocracy? Should
we not rather conclude that if this theory is wrong as applied
to the advanced capitalist countries, it is simply irrelevant as
applied to the Soviet Union? Perhaps the Chinese have answers
to these questions; and if so, we would be interested to know
what they are. In the meantime, we can ask what other possible
causes there may be for revisionism in the Soviet Union.
The moot plausible answer seems to be that the Soviet
people are no more revolutionary than the workers of the advanced capitalist countries, though for different reasons. It is
not that they have shared as junior partners in the exploitation
of a dependent empire, but rather that they have already made
their revolution, have succes~fully defended it in violent struggles,
and have laid the foundations of a rapid advance to higher
standards of living. What they want now is a long period of
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peace and quiet in which to get on with the business in hand.
They want peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and they
are more than willing to believe that their own successes in
building socialism will persuade the whole world to follow in
their footsteps. The pressure on leaders to tell the Soviet people
that these are attainable goals and to orient the country's policies
accordingly would seem to be a sufficient explanation of what
has been happening. Marxism-Leninism is in its essence, as the
Chinese correctly insist, a revolutionary doctrine addressed to
the oppressed and exploited of the world. How can it be expected to appeal to people who are not oppressed or exploited
and who have no need of a revolution?
As for the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist
countries, they represent or seek to represent working classes
which, objectively speaking, do share as junior partners in the
exploitation of dependent empires. These parties either have to
adopt policies which are acceptable to their own workers or
else go into the political wilderness, perhaps for a long time
to CQllle. It can be argued, and we think correctly, that it is
better to take the latter course, to begin now to prepare for the
day when imperialism in decline once again creates the conditions for vigorous revolutionary movements in even the richest
capitalist countries. But no qne should be surprised if established
political parties and leaders seek to maintain their positions even
at the expense of their time-honored principles. Under the circumstances, the apparent paradox of Communists who are also
revisionists and reformists is seen to be really no paradox at all.
Some Conclusions

If this analysis is on the right track, it suggests the following
general conclusions:
First, Marxism-Leninism is as much as ever, perhaps even
more than ever, the appropriate ideology for the oppressed and
exploited majority of mankind. The Chinese as its most faithful
and powerful champions seem certain to become the spiritual
leaders of all genuine revolutionary movements in the world. In
this sense, a new International is in the making, and it gives
every sign of being the biggest and most revolutionary of all the
internationals to date. (The strong leaning of Latin American
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revolutionaries to the Chinese side, for example, can be clearly
read in Eduardo Galeano's article on page 21 of the May
1963 issue of MONTHLY REVIEW.)
Second, the International that groups together the Soviet
Union, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist countries seems unlikely
either to disintegrate or change its nature in the visible future.
Thus what has for more than forty years been an ideologically
and politically united world Communist movement seems on the
way to a deep and lasting split.
What is the relation between the two Communist Internationals likely to be? It is much too early to expect to be able
to give anything like a definitive answer to this crucially important question, but at any rate some of the relevant considerations can be indicated.
There are many good reasons why the two Internationals
should agree to disagree on ideological questions while at the
same time maintaining correct relations and cooperating economically and militarily. Neither group harbors expansionist
designs in the manner of imperialism, and both are menaced
by imperialism. In addition, all members of both groups can
gain through the planned development of the international
division of labor on an ever wider scale. Objective conditions,
therefore, would seem to favor the working out of a modus
vivendi on mutually advantageous terms.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that such an
outcome is by no means assured. The Great Debate has not taken
place entirely in the realm of polite (or not-so-polite) discourse.
The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China in
1960 was deeply resented by the Chinese; so also is the failure
of the Russians to support the Chinese in their border conflict
wi th India. Many revolutionaries around the world are developing a deep feeling of distrust toward Khrushchev and his associates, suspecting them of hankering for deals with the imperialists and blaming them, at least in part, for disastrous
defeats such as that suffered last winter in Iraq. (On this, see
the article by Tabitha Petran in the May 1963 issue of MR.)
The Russians, on their side, unquestionably resent what they
consider to be a grab by the Chinese for leadership of the
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world movement, and they will not meekly give up just because
the Chinese have the better arguments. Other wounds and
potential sources of conflict could be cited, but even this list is
enough to show that there is no lack of fuel to feed the fires
of ill-will and even hatred. It will take extraordinarily wise and
cool leadership on both sides to prevent what is still only a
dispute from degenerating into a mutually damaging and potentially disastrous fight. Whether such leadership exists or will be
forthcoming, time alone will tell.
Meanwhile, those of us who are not already irrevocably
committed to ~ne side or the other and who have the interests
of international socialism at heart can perhaps make a contribution, however small, by maintaining friendly relations with
all groups concerned and urging upon them the desirability,
nay the necessity, of maintaining a united front against imperialism, the real enemy of mankind.
(April 12, 1963)
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